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The Impact of Unionization on University Performance 
 
Mark Cassell1 & Odeh Halaseh2 
Introduction 
The question of whether a unionized labor force hurts or harms an organization’s 
performance has been at the center of political debates since the 19th century. And although 
unionization rates in the United States have declined steadily since the 1970s, the actions by 
governors in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Indiana to weaken public sector unions in 2010 (Greenhouse 
2011), and the recent vote by Volkswagen workers in South Carolina (Greenhouse, 2014) 
underscore that the debate over the impact that organized labor on performance remains a salient 
and important question. However, it is a question often dominated by rhetoric with little 
empirical support. Research on unionization and performance is hampered by the lack of data 
and by declines in unionization rates which make it difficult to identify the influence of 
unionization from a range of other factors that drive performance. Higher education in the public 
sector is one of the few industries in the United States where unionization has remained fairly 
stable over a long period time and thus offers an empirical window into the question of how 
unionization affects organizational performance.  
Of course, unionization in higher education has long been controversial within and outside 
academia. When unionization was first introduced to college campuses in the 1960s faculty 
argued that joining a union would undermine professional identity, create a divisive force on 
campus, reduce the role of faculty senates, and weaken the campus culture of collegiality and 
consensus (Ladd & Lipset, 1973). Recently, during a campaign to unionize faculty at the 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Nicholas C. Burbules, Professor of Education Policy 
expressed similar concerns at a university senate hearing: 
[O]ne way of defining a healthy relationship of shared governance is when the 
administration shares information and decisions with the faculty that it is not strictly 
obligated to do. This happens regularly on this campus and at the university level. 
Collective bargaining would destroy that relationship, not “strengthen it” (Senate Remarks, 
2013). 
                                                 
1 Mark Cassell, Ph.D. is Professor of Political Science at Kent State University. He was Visiting Fulbright Professor 
through June 15, 2014, at Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
2 Odeh Halaseh is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Kent State University. 
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Debate over whether university and college faculty should form a union is even greater 
outside of academia. In statehouses across the United States, governors and legislatures debate 
collective bargaining’s impact on the quality and cost of public goods generally and higher 
education in particular. Republican Governors Scott Walker (Wisconsin), John Kasich (Ohio), 
and Mitch Daniels (Indiana) recommended in 2011 that public-sector collective bargaining be 
banned or severely restricted because it burdens taxpayers and government budgets with higher 
costs (Greenhouse, 2011, A14; Jaschik, 2011). Legislators in Ohio endorsed “charter” or 
“enterprise” universities partly out of concerns about faculty unions (Martin & Samels, 2004). In 
2012, Virginia Foxx (R-North Carolina), chair of the House Subcommittee on Higher Education 
and Workforce, predicted an increase in unionization would seriously limit colleges’ flexibility, 
“potentially putting union bosses in charge of everything from how professors are evaluated for 
tenure to the subject matter and number of courses each faculty member may teach” (Schmidt, 
2012).  
At the center of debates over unionization in higher education is what impact faculty 
unions have on the performance of colleges and universities. Do faculty unions, as their 
detractors suggest, hurt universities by increasing budgets, reducing flexibility, and protecting 
mediocrity (Brown, 1982; Monaghan, 1995; Loyola, 2012)? Or do faculty unions, as proponents 
suggest, improve universities by empowering faculty, institutionalizing faculty governance, and 
holding administrators to higher standards of fairness and transparency (Rhoades, 2011; DeCew, 
2003)? 
Faculty unions are important players in public institutions of higher learning in the United 
States. In close to a third of all public four-year colleges and universities a faculty union 
represents either tenure-tracked faculty, adjuncts, or part-time instructors. About 25% of all 
faculty and staff in U.S. colleges and universities are in a union or covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement. Unionization growth is particularly high among adjuncts and graduate 
students. In 1998, 75,882 adjunct and part-time instructors were represented by unions. By 2012, 
that number had doubled to 147,021 (Berry & Savarese, 2012, p. vii; Julius & DiGiovanni, 
2012). And currently about 20% of graduate student employees or 64,000 graduate student 
employees are represented by unions, distributed among 28 institutions of higher education, all 
in the public sector (Berry & Savarese, 2012; Julius & DiGiovanni, 2012). In short, faculty 
unionization remains robust even as state legislatures seek to curb or even eliminate public sector 
collective bargaining (Clawson, 2013). 
At the same time, there are strong concerns about the cost and quality of higher education. 
According to government data, the inflation-adjusted cost to attend a 4-year public institution in 
the United States rose from $6,381 in 1980-81 to $15,605 in 2010-11—an increase of 144%. 
Among 4-year private institutions, average tuition and fees have increased 128%, from $13,995 
2
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol6/iss1/3
  
in 1980-81 to $31,975 in 2010-11 (U.S. Dept. of Education 2012). The increase in tuition means 
the average American graduate leaves college with $26,600 of debt ("Universities Challenged; 
Higher Education," 2013).  
Adding to concerns, researchers note that the proportion of students entering college who 
receive degrees has slowed while the time-to-completion has risen among college graduates in 
the United States over the past three decades (Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2010). Higher costs 
coupled with declining graduation rates are driving policy makers on the right and the left to seek 
answers for how to lower higher education costs while improving graduation and completion 
rates.  
 In this environment, faculty unions have become easy scapegoats for explaining higher 
costs and lower quality. Critiques of union are at times justified, but they can also deflect 
attention from more significant underlying causes of a problem. This study sheds light on 
unions’ impact on the organizational efficiency and effectiveness in higher education by first 
theorizing the causal connections between faculty unions and higher education performance. In 
addition, the study presents the result of an empirical analysis of higher education performance 
using data from the Department of Education’s Integrated Post Secondary Data System (IPEDS) 
spanning more than two decades and more than 430 public universities and colleges. 
Organizational efficiency is defined in the empirical section as an institution’s core expenses per 
degree or completion. We define organizational effectiveness as the number of degrees or 
completions per 100 Full-Time Students. We include completion because it offers a more 
inclusive measure of university output than simply degrees awarded. “Completions” includes 
degree attainment but also certifications and other programmatic credentials. Although they 
capture only a general understanding of organizational performance, our measures of efficiency 
and effectiveness are commonly used by scholars, policymakers and the public to assess higher 
education performance (Goenner & Snaith, 2003; Rickinson & Rutherford, 1995). Moreover, we 
believe the size of our sample and the length of our time series enables us to contribute to an 
understanding of organizational performance and will generate additional research into the 
issues. 
The article is organized as follows: Section II discusses several prominent theories that link 
unionization to organizational performance. Section III discusses the methodological challenges, 
research design and method used in the study. The results of the cross-sectional time series 
analyses are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes with a summary of the major findings 
and outstanding questions prompted by the research.  
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Theoretical Connections Between Unions and Higher Education Performance 
How do unions impact organizational performance in higher education? What is the 
relationship between a complex public organization’s performance and a unionized labor force? 
Beneath much of the rhetoric one can identify several prominent theoretical approaches in the 
scholarly literature.  
Rational Choice/Labor Market Distortion Model 
A common theoretical approach treats faculty as rational actors driven to maximize their 
self-interest by demanding higher wages and salaries, greater job security, and greater span of 
control over their organizational environment (Cohen & Noll 1998; James 1990; Niskanen 
1971). As one conservative think tank put it: 
Were it not for the exception government makes for [unions], they would be illegal and 
possibly criminal under the antitrust laws, for the good reasons that they extract special 
benefits for a few at the expense of the rest of society by suppressing free competition 
(Loyola, 2012, p.2)  
Once organized into a labor cartel (i.e. faculty union) the utility-maximizing faculty 
exercise greater leverage within the organization than would be the case in a competitive labor 
market. This theory argues that the distortion in the faculty labor market caused by unionization 
contributes to outputs that weaken organizational efficiency and effectiveness.  
Scholars note that unionization can lead to organizational rigidity by codifying informal 
procedures, standardizing rules, and institutionalizing transparency and accountability (Julius & 
DiGiovanni, 2012; Baldridge, 1978). Gilmore (1981) and Birnbaum (1980) also find that 
unionization reduces collegiality and trust on campuses between faculty and administrators. 
Others argue that the market distortion caused by unions protects mediocre faculty at the expense 
of more productive faculty, thus reducing the overall effectiveness of the institution (Riley, 
2011).  
Perhaps the strongest connection between unionization and organizational performance 
centers on costs, according to this theory. The distortion in the faculty labor market caused by 
unions enables self-interested faculty to leverage wages and benefits higher than they would be 
in a competitive labor market (Marlow 2013; Vedder, Denhardt, & Robe 2012; see also Riley 
2011). As a result, college and university efficiency is undermined. The question of whether 
wages and, by extension, university costs are driven up by unionization remains decidedly 
unclear (Ashraf & Williams 2008; Ashraf 1997). Recent research finds only a slight “union 
premium” (Hendrick, Hensen, Krieg, & Wassell, 2011). Moreover, some scholars also argue that 
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the causal arrow moves in the opposite direction: that weaker universities are more likely to be 
unionized and weaker faculty (with lower salaries) are attracted to unionized schools.  
In short, a rational choice theoretical approach leads to two hypotheses: 
 
H1: All else equal, public universities and colleges with unionized faculty are less efficient 
than schools without a union. 
 
H2: All else equal, public universities and colleges with unionized faculty are less effective 
than schools without a union. 
Bureaucratic Discretion Model 
A model in public administration articulated by Carl Friedrich (1940) offers an alternative 
to rational choice theory. In a famous debate with Herman Finer, Friedrich argued that complex 
organizations work best when professionals are given the administrative autonomy to solve 
problems. Moreover, employees are held accountable not through top-down administrative rule-
making but through the professional and technical training which incorporate ethical standards 
and norms. An effective organization is one in which professionals are given the freedom to 
make tough decisions and solve difficult administrative problems.  
  Unionization, in this model, maintains, defends and promotes not only academic 
freedom, but a clear role for faculty in the governance of the university, one insulated from the 
capricious behavior of administrators, politicians or corporations. Gary Rhoades, former 
President of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), writes, “The push…is 
for accountability that is grounded in the local realities and distinctive missions of American 
colleges and universities; that draws on the expertise of professionals on the ground more than 
on the commitments of politicians and foundations far from the action” (Rhoades, 2011, p. 25). 
Benjamin Ginsberg (2011) suggests that a spike in the number of university administrators 
relative to the number of faculty since 1995 has weakened higher education by eroding faculty 
governance. The shift to a more administration-dominated university, according to Ginsberg, 
bloats university budgets and lowers performance because administrators are paid well above the 
average faculty and often lack substantive expertise in areas in which they exercise control, and 
because administrative turnover is much higher than faculty turnover. Faculty unions can temper 
such trends by institutionalizing faculties’ role in university governance vis-à-vis a collective 
bargaining agreement and ensuring that clear and transparent standards are developed and 
followed (Franke, 1984; Wickens, 2008).    
Proponents of unionization argue further that faculty unions serve as a counter-weight to 
competitive budgeting approaches like the ubiquitous Responsibility Center Model (RCM) 
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which promote an accountability that turns departments and faculty into individual cost centers 
beholden not to professional standards but to administrator-determined bottom lines. In this 
theory, faculty unions preserve faculty autonomy while countering the organizational 
balkanization that can occur from RCM or the advent of the entrepreneurial university (Rhoades, 
2011). 
In short, the bureaucratic discretion model generates two additional hypotheses: 
 
H3: All else equal, public universities and colleges with unionized faculty are more 
efficient than schools without a union. 
 
H4: All else equal, public universities and colleges with unionized faculty are more 
effective than schools without a union. 
Institutional, Partisan And Socio-Economic Theories 
Although this research is primarily interested in understanding the relationship of faculty 
unions to higher education performance, scholars also identify several state-level factors 
related to unionization that can also impact university performance. Institutional scholarship 
by Knott and Payne (2004) and Lowry (2001) find that state structures influence the cost and 
quality of public universities and colleges. Knott and Payne (2004) and Lowry (2001) 
examine the influence of state-wide governing or coordinator boards which oversee higher 
education. Each body of research takes up a slightly different question. Using a cross-
sectional data set of Ph.D.-granting public schools spanning 1987-1998, Knott and Payne 
consider how the degree of centralization and power within the governing board influences 
performance. Lowry, using cross-sectional data, considers what impact coordinating boards 
and trustee appointments by the governor have on tuition costs and university spending 
priorities. Both bodies of research find that governing boards with great capacity exercise 
greater control over public colleges and universities. Knott and Payne also find that partisan 
control of state government influences higher education performance. Drawing upon Knott 
and Payne and Lowry’s work, we develop the following hypotheses: 
H5: All else being equal, more centralized and more powerful state governing boards lead 
to more efficient public colleges and universities.  
 
H6: All else being equal, states with more centralized and more powerful governing 
boards lead to more effective public colleges and universities. 
Scholars note that, when analyzing the influence of labor unions on public organizations, 
another important factor is whether there are laws which prohibit unions from charging non-
union-member employees for union representation. In states without such so-called “Right-to-
Work” (RTW) laws, unions can negotiate provisions that require employees covered by a union-
negotiated contract to pay some portion of the dues. RTW laws currently exist in 24 states. 
Scholars find that in those states with RTW laws it is more difficult to form a union than in states 
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where unions and employers are free to bargain contracts that include these fair share payments 
(Ichniowski & Zax, 1991; Ellwood & Fine, 1987). And work by the Economic Policy Institute 
suggests that so-called RTW laws lower wages among public employees in a state (Gould & 
Shierholz, 2012). There is little scholarship on whether RTW laws influence higher education 
performance. Yet, the scholarship suggests that RTW laws lower public sector investment which 
may reduce costs but also may reduce effectiveness as institutions struggle to make do with less. 
The following hypotheses flow from the scholarship on RTW laws:  
 
H7: All else equal, states with RTW laws experience more efficient public colleges and 
universities. 
 
H8: All else equal, states with RTW laws experience more effective public colleges and 
universities. 
Lastly, scholars who study higher education budgets note the importance of both a state’s 
economic health and state politics in shaping the budgets of public colleges and universities 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Ehrenberg, 2006; Hearn, Griswold, & Marine, 1996). Republican-
dominated state houses are viewed as more fiscally conservative and less likely to fund higher 
education. At the same time, a more robust state economy contributes to higher state revenues 
and more options for funding higher education. Lower state support is likely to increase the cost-
efficiency of higher education as schools operate with a lower level of state support. At the same 
time, increases in state support are likely to increase the effectiveness of a university or college. 
We thus close our theoretical section with four final hypotheses: 
 
H9: All else equal, states with a Republican-dominated statehouse experience more 
efficient public colleges and universities. 
 
H10: All else equal, states with a Republican-dominated statehouse experience less 
effective public colleges and universities. 
 
H11: All else equal, states with a stronger economy experience less efficient public colleges 
and universities. 
 
H12: All else equal states with a stronger economy experience more effective public 
colleges and universities. 
The hypotheses presented here are not mutually exclusive. Indeed various theoretical 
models likely complement each other. For example, RTW states may well likely also reduce 
costs but in all likelihood the rules will also influence the strength of unionization in the state. 
Similarly, those within the college or university who want to reduce the influence of a faculty 
union may be emboldened by a Republican state legislature and governor who publicly seek to 
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abolish or limit public sector labor unions. Such issues speak to the methodological challenges 
addressed in the next section. 
 
Research Design, Data and Methodology  
Scholarship on unionization and higher education typically uses cross-sectional data 
analysis. However, since cross-sectional data offer only a snapshot in time, such approaches are 
unable to capture change in their models. Our research design addresses the problem by using 
panel data regression analysis to examine the effect of unionization on changes in university 
performance and behavior. In this case the units are 433 public four-year universities reporting 
data annually for 23 years. 
The data for this research come from the Delta Cost Project, a research organization that 
has developed a cross-state longitudinal database from the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) data at the National Center for Educational Statistics. The value added by 
the Delta Cost Project’s database is that it enables one to evaluate variables over time and put 
information in context through comparison with patterns in other states (Delta Cost Project, 
2011).  
To maintain a narrow focus, we exclude vocational schools, medical schools and public 2-
year institutions. And, because of the Supreme Court’s NLRB v. Yeshiva University (1980) 
decision3, private institutions are also excluded from the database. The 433 public universities 
over 23 years generate approximately 9,461 observations. The precise number of observations 
varies because of missing data for certain observations and variables. Variables used in the 
analysis are described in the Appendix.  
 Dependent variables  
We explore the relationship between unionization and performance along two fronts that 
reflect different values. The first value is efficiency. Are universities without unions more 
efficient than universities with unions? As noted at the start, we define efficiency in two ways: 1) 
core expenses per degree; and 2) core expenses per completion. The IPEDS dataset defines “core 
expenses” to include expenditures on instruction, research, public service, academic support, 
student services, institutional support, operations and maintenance, and scholarships and 
                                                 
3 The Supreme Court held that the implied exemption from National Labor Relations Act coverage for so-called 
managerial employees applied to faculty members at Yeshiva, because their authority over University academic 
policy was nearly absolute. While it did not prohibit unionization at private institutions, the decision makes it 
extremely difficult for faculty in private institutions to bargain collectively (NLRB, 1980, 672). 
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fellowships. Were unionization rates equally distributed across the country, the variation in the 
cost of living would not bias the results. But because, for example, unionization is positively 
correlated with living costs estimates of union impacts that omit this relationship overstate the 
impact of unionization (Hendrick, Hensen, Krieg, & Wassell, 2011). Therefore, our expense 
measures are adjusted for inflation over time and across states. 
We also measure university performance in terms of effectiveness: How well does the 
university fulfill its educational mission regardless of cost? While no single measure can easily 
capture the mission of an institution, state legislators increasingly use outcomes such as 
completions and graduation rates as proxies for effectiveness. Two measures of effectiveness are, 
therefore, used:  
Number of degrees per 100 full-time students. Number of degrees conferred per 100 
full-time enrolled students by a college, university, or other postsecondary education institution 
as official recognition for the successful completion of a program of study;  
Number of completions per 100 full-time students. Number of completions per 100 full-
time enrolled students by a college, university, or other postsecondary education institution as 
official recognition for the successful completion of a program of studies.  
Although they offer only a general picture, the measures used to assess efficiency and 
effectiveness take into account university expenses, student numbers, and degrees awarded.  
Independent Variables  
Our central independent variable is unionization. The National Center for the Study of 
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions (NCSCBHEP) collects the most 
comprehensive information on unionization among colleges and universities. Using 2010 data 
provided by NCSCBHEP we construct a dummy variable if any subgroup of faculty (full-time, 
part-time, or adjuncts) are represented by a union at the institution (1=union, 0=nonunion). Our 
measure does not specify union affiliation (AFT, AAUP, etc.) nor does it capture what 
percentage of the faculty are members. Based on qualitative scholarship that describes first-hand 
accounts of organizing a faculty union, just having a faculty union introduces formal and 
transparent personnel processes to the entire university, strengthens the governing role of the 
entire faculty including those not in a union, and typically reduces administrative discretion 
(Govea, 1998). 
For our institutional variables we use Knott and Payne’s (2004) classification of higher 
education structures across states. Knott and Payne classify each state into one of three 
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categories: “highly regulated” (coded as a “3”) are states with a governing or coordinating board 
and strong regulatory powers; “moderately regulated” (coded here as “2”) are states in which a 
coordinating board exists with some regulatory powers; and “minimally regulated” (coded as 
“1”) are states which have a coordinating board, advisory or planning agency with few formal 
regulatory powers. In addition, we create a dummy variable for whether a state operates under a 
set RTW laws that prohibit unions from charging non-union members fees for union 
representation.  
A set of partisan and economic variables are also included in the analysis. We create a 
measure of Republican control of government by merging data on the partisan character of each 
state government. The variable measures the percentage of state institutions (assembly, senate, 
and executive) controlled by the Republican Party. Thus, if the Republican Party controls only 
one house of government the variable is .33, two houses is .66, and two houses plus the 
governorship is 1. This varies over time. Our indicator of state economic performance uses per 
capita state Gross Domestic Product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the Department of 
Commerce. This also varies over time. 
Finally, we include several control variables that studies of higher education find important 
in explaining higher education performance. Because the performance dynamics of larger 
schools likely differ from smaller schools, we include total school enrollment as a control 
variable. Also, because the type of degree granting institution (Ph.D., MA, or BA) can influence 
performance, we control for the Carnegie Classifications. And lastly, we include a measure of 
selectivity as a control variable. Selectivity is measured here in terms of the number of students 
who apply divided by the number of students admitted. A higher number signifies a less selective 
school and a lower number indicates fewer admissions per applications and thus a more selective 
institution. Admission and application information in the Delta Cost Project, does not cover all 
schools for all years. We, therefore, use data for 2009 and assume that selectivity (like the 
Carnegie Classification) is relatively stable over time4. We recognize the flaws in assuming a 
school’s academic reputation is stable; school reputations clearly rise and fall over time. Other 
possible selectivity measures, including US News and Reports rankings, resulted in a loss of 
data. Similarly, when we attempted to include our measure of selectivity (admissions/ 
applications) for other years, we again lost data. In the end, we opted to rely on 2009 data in 
order to retain the size of our data set.  
There are a number of methodological challenges associated with panel data (Zhu, 2012). 
The advantage, according to Zhu, is that it provides researchers with the ability to deal with 
“rarely changing variables and unobserved heterogeneity across units” (p. 396). The challenges 
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of using panel data, however, are significant. There are debates over whether to use fixed or 
random effects. Adjusting for correlated errors along spatial or temporal dimensions is difficult. 
And, if the theory is weak, the model may suffer from various forms of omitted-variable bias 
(Beck 2011).  
While there are various approaches to addressing nonspherical errors, we draw upon Beck 
and Katz (1995, 1996) and use panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to deal with the problems 
of panel heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation across panels. Moreover, we correct for serial 
autocorrelation by using the panel-specific correction (PSAR(1)). PSAR (1) yields a better model 
fit than the general AR(1) if heterogeneity is detected in the error structure (Zhu, 2012, p. 406).  
We supplement our time-series analysis by running several cross-sectional Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) models using data from 2009. We incorporate a temporal element into our cross-
sectional models in two ways. First, the dependent variable is defined as the percentage change 
in our efficiency and effectiveness indicators from 1987 to 2009. Second, instead of using a 
simple dummy variable for union, we develop a continuous variable that reflects the number of 
years a college or university has had a union on campus. Because our data set spans 23 years, our 
continuous union variable ranges from 0 to 23 with mean of 7.4 and standard deviation of 10. 5. 
The assumption in our cross-sectional models is that whatever effect (positive, negative, or none) 
unionization has on effectiveness and efficiency, it is likely to be more apparent the longer a 
faculty union has been on campus. The purpose of the cross-sectional models is to examine the 
question of unionization’s impact on organizational efficiency and effectiveness from a different 
perspective while still accounting for time.  
Empirical Assessment 
Results from our empirical models are summarized in Table 1. The table describes the 
hypotheses, whether the signs of the coefficients are in the direction suggested by the theoretical 




Summary of Results of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Results*/Statistical Significance** 
Rational Choice/Labor Market Distortion  
H1: All else equal, public universities and colleges 
with unionized faculty are less efficient than 
schools without a union 
No support/Statistically Significant 
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Hypothesis Results*/Statistical Significance** 
H2: All else equal, public universities and colleges 
with unionized faculty are less effective than 
schools without a union 
No support/ Statistically Not Significant 
Bureaucratic Discretion  
H3: All else equal, public universities and colleges 
with unionized faculty are more efficient than 
schools without a union 
Support/Statistically Significant 
H4: All else equal, public universities and colleges 
with unionized faculty are more effective than 
schools without a union 
Support/Statistically Significant 
Institutions  
H5: All else being equal, more centralized and 
more powerful state governing boards lead to more 
efficient public colleges and universities  
Support/Statistically Significant 
H6: All else being equal, states with more 
centralized and more powerful governing boards 
lead to more effective public colleges and 
universities 
No support/ Statistically Not Significant 
H7: All else equal, states with RTW laws 
experience more efficient public colleges and 
universities 
Support/Statistically Not Significant 
H8: All else equal, states with RTW laws 
experience more effective public colleges and 
universities 
Support/Statistically Significant 
Partisan Control & Economic Health  
H9: All else equal, states with a Republican-
dominated statehouse experience more efficient 
public colleges and universities 
Support/Not Statistically Significant 
H10: All else equal, states with a Republican-
dominated statehouse experience less effective 
public colleges and universities 
No support/Statistically Significant 
H11: All else equal, states with a stronger 
economy experience less efficient public colleges 
and universities  
Support/Not Statistically Significant 
H12: All else equal states with a stronger economy 
experience more effective public colleges and 
universities  
Support/Statistically Significant 
* Sign of coefficient supports or does not support the hypothesis. ** Coefficient is significant at.05 level or lower. 
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Factors that affect efficiency and effectiveness at 4-year public institutions of higher education 
from 1987-2009 
 Efficiency Effectiveness 










Union -12212.32*** -13555.13***   1.157*** 1.154*** 
Selectivity of 
Institution -130673.1*** -142598.9*** -3.353*** -3.846*** 
Republican Control 
of State Gov. -748.164 -664.919 0.335 0.401* 
Knott and Payne 
Structural Controls -1197.186   -1446.745*   -0.035   -0.013   
Total Full-time 
Enrollment 0.256  0.417** -0.000019*  -0.0000101   
Carnegie 2005 
Classification 5286.029   10286.5*   -2.149*** -1.740*** 
State GDP Per 
Capita 204.76  175.416  0.0000735***   0.0000733*** 
Right to Work State -370.884  -2454.587   -0.583* -0.608* 
Constant 165192.6***   166773.9***   25.422***  25.247*** 
Rho 0.836    0.816     0.785 0.781 
Groups 434 434 434 434 
Observations 9933 9933 9937 9937 
     
R2 0.452 0.472 0.356 0.3243 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Overall, we find little support for the Rational Choice/Labor Market Distortion hypotheses, 
strong support for the Bureaucratic Discretion hypotheses, and mixed results on the impact of 
institutions, partisanship and the state’s economic wellbeing. Detailed results of our time series 
cross-sectional analysis is presented in Table 2. Table 3 describes the results of our cross-
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Percentage Change in Cost per Degree 1987-2009/Percentage Change in Cost per Completion 
1987-2009 
 Efficiency Effectiveness 
Variables 
% Change In 
Cost Per 
Completion 
% Change In 
Cost Per Degree 
% Change In 
Completions Per 
100 Students 
% Change In 
Degrees Per 100 
Students 
Number of Years 
Unionized -2.068* -1.052**  0.01 0.097  
Selectivity of 
Institution -99.181*  -34.055  -5.131 -7.203  
Republican Control 
of State Gov. -6.252  0.102  -7.309* -7.382* 
Knott and Payne 
Structural Controls -11.036  -1.747  -0.486 -0.93 
Total Full-time 
Enrollment 0.0006072  0.0001692  0.0000683 0.0001105  
Carnegie 2005 
Classification 51.435*** 18.1803***  -0.868 1.647  
State GDP Per 
Capita -1.526  -0.52  0.299 0.217  
Right to Work State -16.905  -9.255  7.669* 8.738**  
Hospital -0.665  5.526  2.514  3.936  
Constant 98.327  37.971  7.578  7.014  
Observations 429 429 428 428 
R2 0.0957 0.0728 0.0394 0.0485 
Adjusted R2 0.0762 0.0529 0.0187 0.0280 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Unionization. On the question of efficiency and unionization, the results from our cross-
sectional time series models indicate that a faculty union is associated with $12,212 reduction in 
a school’s core expenses per completion and a $13,555 reduction in core expenses per degree 
award. The union variable coefficients are statistically significant while controlling for cost of 
living differences by state and over time, size and selectivity of the institution, the institution’s 
Carnegie classification, and whether the school is located in a state that prohibits unions from 
requiring workers to pay for the benefits of union representation. Our model explains 
approximately 45 per cent of the variation in our dependent variables measuring efficiency. Does 
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this mean that forming a faculty union increases the efficiency of a college or university? Maybe. 
an alternative explanation is that unions are more likely to form when public colleges and 
universities cut funds and reduce expenses. But what happens to efficiency the longer a union 
has been on campus? Our cross-sectional model presented in Table 3 suggests that the longer a 
school has a faculty union, the more efficient it becomes. For every year between 1987 and 2009 
that a school has a faculty union, core expenses per completion decline by about 2.1 per cent and 
core expenses per degree decline by 1.1 per cent.  
On the question of unionization and effectiveness, the results from our cross-sectional time 
series models support the view that faculty unions increase a school’s effectiveness as measured 
by the number of degrees or completions awarded per 100 students. Schools with a faculty union 
are associated with 1.2 additional degrees and completions per 100 students after controlling for 
other factors. Our union variable is statistically significant at the .001 level and our model 
explains about a third of variance. At the same time, our cross-sectional model that uses 2009 
data finds that, while the age of a union is positively associated with the number of degrees and 
completions, the coefficient for union years is not statistically significant.  
Institutional effects. In our analysis we also consider the impact of institutions on 
efficiency and effectiveness. Our results paint a mixed picture. We hypothesized that greater 
centralized control increases efficiency and effectiveness. We find some support for the 
efficiency hypothesis and no support for the effectiveness hypotheses. As hypothesized, a more 
centralized governing body is associated with a lower cost per degree (-1,446), statistically 
significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for Knott and Payne’s variable, however, is not 
statistically significant in our cost-per-completion model, although the sign of the coefficient is 
in the predicted direction. Knott and Payne’s variable is also not statistically significant in 
explaining the number of degrees and completion granted per 100 students. 
Coefficients for RTW laws are in the direction we hypothesized. We expect RTW laws to 
increase cost efficiency while lowering effectiveness. The RTW coefficient is negative across all 
four models, suggesting that such institutions contribute to lower school expenses and also lower 
outcomes. At the same time, only the coefficients for our two effectiveness measures are 
statistically significant.  
Partisan and economic impacts. We hypothesize that public colleges and universities in 
Republican-dominated state governments are more efficient and less effective than those in less 
Republican-dominated states. Results from analysis find little support for either hypothesis. 
Although the coefficients in our efficiency models are negative, the results are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, the partisanship coefficient for one of our effectiveness models 
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(completions per 100 students) suggests a Republican-dominated state government is positively 
associated with a school’s effectiveness.  
State GDP per capita’s influence on university and college outcomes is positive and 
statistically significant. As we hypothesized, a stronger economy appears to contribute to a larger 
number of degrees and completions per 100 students. State GDP per capita is also positively 
associated with core expenses per degree and completion (i.e., less efficient), however, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Control variables. Three control variables are included in the model: size of the institution 
(student enrollment), selectivity and Carnegie classification. The number of students is positively 
associated with the cost per degree and cost per completion. The larger the institution, the more 
costly it is to graduate a student although only cost per degree is statistically significant. For 
every 1000 additional students, core expenses per degree increases by $417. At the same time, 
larger institutions are associated with fewer completions and degrees per 1000 students. For 
every 1000 students, the number of degrees award declines by .02 per cent.  
Selectively is also a statistically significant factor in explaining organizational efficiency 
and effectiveness. Selectivity is measured as the number of applications divided by the number 
of admissions. A large number suggests that many applicants were admitted and the school is 
less selective. The negative coefficients for selectivity across our four performance measures, 
suggests less selective schools spend significantly less per degree and completion and graduate 
fewer students.5 Finally, the Carnegie Classification measure is statistically significant in three of 
our four time series models.  
 
Conclusion and Future Research 
This article began with the general question of what impact unionization has on 
organizational performance by studying an industry where unionization has remained relatively 
stable over a long period of time. Based on the experience of public four-year institutions over 
23 years we find, all things being equal, that unionization improves efficiency and effectiveness. 
It remains unclear whether unions help create more efficient academic institutions or whether 
unionization is likely to occur when academic institutions cut back on budgets. It is also unclear 
whether unions help create an environment that promotes higher graduation and completion rates 
                                                 
5 We achieve similar results using Barrons college admissions’ competitiveness selectivity measure. The Barrons 
measure, however, does not include some schools in our dataset. Moreover, our measure is continuous while 
Barrons uses a 1 to 4 ranking where 1 indicates “most competitive,” 2 is “highly competitive plus,” 3 is “highly 
competitive,” and 4 is “very competitive plus.”  
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or whether unionized institutions attract faculty that are more interested in activities that increase 
graduation rates such as teaching over research.  
We offer some circumstantial evidence that suggests the causal arrow moves from unions 
to efficiency and effectiveness. For instance we control for the size and selectivity of schools. 
Also, by only including public institutions, we control for institutional type. In addition, our 
cross-sectional OLS models find that the longer a faculty union exists on campus the greater the 
efficiency gains. The impact of union years on effectiveness was positive but not statistically 
significant.  
Although we find support for the bureaucratic discretion model, colleges and universities 
remain complex organizations and our analysis only underscores the need for future research in 
at least three general areas. First, more nuanced measures of efficiency and effectiveness are 
necessary. Core expenses or number of degree awarded are poor short-hand measures for 
capturing what a school does and whether it does it efficiently or not. More program-, 
departmental-, or even college-specific measures may offer more reliable assessments of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
Second, our research says little about what unions do within the university to influence 
efficiency or effectiveness. For example, do unions impact research output or grantsmanship? 
Does a faculty union increase or decrease the ability of faculty to spend more time advising or 
teaching students? Does a faculty union reduce faculty turnover? Or what role do faculty unions 
play in the development and adoption of new learning technologies? These questions suggest 
that a qualitative study of a single institution or small set of institutions over time may be more 
appropriate than a large-N quantitative analysis.  
Finally, we began with Benjamin Ginsburg’s (2011) claim that a spike in the number of 
administrators relative to faculty undermines the effectiveness of higher education while 
simultaneously driving up costs. A question derived from our study is whether faculty unions 
influence the priorities of university and colleges. Does a faculty union reduce the number of 
administrators or the resources a school devotes to administration? If so then unionization may 
impact efficiency and effectiveness indirectly – through unions’ impact on schools’ choices of 
administrative- or faculty-centered governance.  
  
17
Cassell and Halaseh: The Impact of Unionization




Archibald, R. B., & Feldman, D. H. (2006). “State higher education spending and the tax 
revolt.” The Journal of Higher Education 77 (4): 618-44. 
Ashraf, J. & Williams, M. F. (2008). “The effect of faculty unions on salaries: Some 
recent evidence.” Journal of Collective Negotiations (formerly Journal of Collective 
Negotiations in the Public Sector) 32, no. 2 :141-50. 
Ashraf, J. (1997). “The effect of unions on professors’ salaries: The evidence over twenty 
years.” Journal of Labor Research 18, no. 3: 439-50.  
Baldridge, J. V. (1978). Policy making and effective leadership: A national study of 
academic management. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Beck, N. & Katz, J. N. (1996). “Nuisance versus substance: Specifying and estimating 
time-series cross-section models.” Political Analysis 6: 1-36. 
Beck, N. & Katz, J. N. (1995). “What to do (and not do) with time-series cross-section 
data.” American Political Science Review 89: 634-47.  
Beck, N. (2011). “Of fixed-effects and time-invariant variables.” Political Analysis 19: 
119-22. 
Berry, J. & Savarese, M. (2012). Directory of U.S. faculty contracts and bargaining 
agents in institutions of higher education. National Center for the Study of 
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, Hunter College, 
CUNY, New York. 
Birnbaum, R. (1980). Creative academic bargaining: Managing conflict in the unionized 
college and university. New York: Teachers College Press, Teachers College, 
Columbia University. 
Bound, J., Lovenheim, M. F., & Turner, S. (2010). “Why have college completion rates 
declined? An analysis of changing student preparation and collegiate resources.” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 3: 129-57.  
Brown, W. R. (1982). Academic politics. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press. 
Clawson, D. (2013). “Faculty unions at the crossroads: Why playing defense is a losing 
strategy.” New Labor Forum 22 (1): 29-35. 
Cohen, L. R., & Noll, R. G. (1998). “Universities, constituencies, and the role of the 
states.” In Challenges for Research Universities, ed. R. G. Noll. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
18
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol6/iss1/3
  
Davey, M. (2011). “Wisconsin senate limits bargaining by public workers.” New York 
Times, March 9. 
DeCew, J. W. (2003). Unionization in the academy: Visions and realities. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Delta Cost Project. (2011). Delta Cost Project IPEDS Database. 
http://www.deltacostproject.org/data/  
Ehrenberg, R. (2006). “The perfect storm and the privatization of public higher 
education.” Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning 38(1): 46-53.  
Ellwood, D. T., & Fine, G. (1987). “The impact of right-to-work laws on union 
organizing.” Journal of Political Economy 95(2): 250-73.  
Franke, A. H. (1984). “Two trends in academic collective bargaining: A faculty 
representative's perspective.” Journal of Law and Education 13 (4): 651-68. 
Friedrich, C. J. (1940). “Public policy and the nature of administrative responsibility.” In 
Public Policy ed. Carl J. Friedrich. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gilmore, C. B. (1981). “The impact of faculty collective bargaining on the management 
of public higher educational institutions.” Journal of Collective Negotiations in the 
Public Sector 10(2): 145-52.  
Ginsberg, B. (2011). The fall of the faculty: The rise of the all-administrative university 
and why it matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Goenner, C. F., & Snaith, S. M. (2003). “Predicting graduation rates: An analysis of 
student and institutional factors at doctoral universities.” Journal of College Student 
Retention: Research, Theory and Practice 5 (4): 409-20.  
Gould, E. & Shierholz, H. (2012). “Average worker in ‘right-to-work’ state earns $1,500 
less each year.” Economic Policy Institute. December 12. Accessed September 24. 
http://www.epi.org/publication/average-worker-right-to-work-state/  
Govea, R. M. (1998). “The unionization of Cleveland State: An insider's story.” Academe 
84(6): 34-38. 
Greenhouse, S. (2011). “A watershed moment for public-sector unions.” New York Times 
(New York), February 18. 
Greenhouse, S. (2014). “Volkswagen vote is defeat for labor in south.” New York Times 
(New York), February 14. 
Hearn, J. C., Griswold, C. P., & Marine, G. M. (1996). “Region, resources, and reason: A 
contextual analysis of state tuition and student aid policies.” Research in Higher 
Education 37 (3): 141-78. 
19
Cassell and Halaseh: The Impact of Unionization
Published by The Keep, 2014
  
Hendrick, D. W., Hensen, S. E., Krieg, J. M., & Wassell Jr., C. S. (2011). “Is there really 
a faculty union salary premium?” ILR Review 64(3): 1-18. 
Ichniowski, C. & Zax, J. S. (1991). “Right-to-work laws, free riders, and unionization in 
the local public sector.” Journal of Labor Economics 9 (3): 255-75.  
James, E. (1990). “Decision processes and priorities in higher education.” In The 
Economics of American Universities: Management, Operations and Fiscal 
Environment, eds. Stephen A. Hoenack and Eileen L. Collins. Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press. 
Jaschik, S. (2011). “Why they are rallying.” Inside Higher Ed. February 23. 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/02/23/ohio_faculty_union_leaders_talk
_about_why_they_value_collective_bargaining  
Julius, D. J., & DiGiovanni Jr., N. (2012). “What’s ahead in faculty collective 
bargaining? The new and the déjà vu.” Journal of Collective Bargaining in the 
Academy 4 (5). Accessed August 15, 2013. http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol4/iss1/5  
Knott, J. H., & Payne. A. A. (2004). “The impact of state governance structures on 
management and performance of public organizations: A study of higher education 
institutions.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23 (1): 13-30.  
Ladd, E. C. & Lipset, S. M. (1973). Professors, Unions, and American Higher 
Education,. Berkeley, CA: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. 
Lewin, T. (2013). “Obama’s plan aims to lower cost of college.” New York Times, 
August 22. 
Lowry, R. C. (2001). “Governmental structure, trustee selection, and public university 
prices and spending: Multiple means to similar ends.” American Journal of 
Political Science 45 (4): 845-61. 
Loyola, M. (2012). “Tenth amendment.” Texas Public Policy Foundation. December 12. 
Accessed August 15, 2013. http://www.texaspolicy.com/center/tenth-
amendment/blog/when-unions-become-government-sponsored-cartels  
Marlow, M. L. (2013). “Public sector unions and government size.” Applied Economics 
Letters 20 (5): 466-70. 
Martin, J., & Samels, J. E. (2004). Presidential transition in higher education: Managing 
leadership change. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Monaghan, P. (1995). “Technology and the unions.” Chronicle of Higher Education, 
February 10. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine, 
Atherton. 
20
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol6/iss1/3
  
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ. (1980). US 444 (No. 78-857): 672. 
Rhoades, G. (2011). “Faculty unions, business models, and the academy's future.” 
Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning 43(6): 20-26. 
Rickinson, B. & Rutherford, D. (1995). “Increasing undergraduate student retention 
rates." British Journal of Guidance and Counselling 23(2): 161-72. 
Riley, N. S. (2011). The faculty lounges: And other reasons why you won't get the college 
education you paid for. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 
Schmidt, P. (2012). “House Republicans denounce federal labor board's actions as 
threatening colleges.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. September 12.. 
Accessed September 05, 2013. http://chronicle.com/article/At-Hearing-Labor-
Board-Is/134318/  
Senate Remarks on Faculty Unionization. (2013). University of Illinois Faculty Senate, 
February 4. (Testimony of Nicholas C. Burbules). 
Siegel, J. (2013). “Ohio’s $62 billion budget approved.” Columbus Dispatch, June 28. 
Universities Challenged; Higher Education. (2013). The Economist (US), August 31. 
Accessed September 6, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21584393-barack-obama-wants-degrees-be-better-value-money-universities-
challenged  
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2012). Digest of 
Education Statistics, 2011 (NCES 2012-001), Table 349. 
Vedder, R., Denhardt, M. & Robe, J. (2012). “Ohio right-to-work.” Buckeye Institute for 
Public Policy Solutions. Columbus, OH. 
Wickens, C. M. (2008). “The organizational impact of university labor unions.” Higher 
Education 56(5): 545-64. 
Witwer, D. S. (2008). Corruption and reform in the Teamsters union. Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press. 
Zhu, L. (2012). “Panel data analysis in public administration: Substantive and statistical 




Cassell and Halaseh: The Impact of Unionization




Variable Observa-tions Mean 
Standard 




11820 121932.2 797844.7 
A measure of spending on direct 
educational costs per degree (in 
contrast to cost per student 
enrolled); education and related 
expenses (for all students) are 
divided by all degrees awarded in 
the same year. 




11837 116363.9 596094.2 
A measure of spending on total 
educational costs per completion 
(in contrast to costs per student 
enrolled); education and related 
expenses (for all students) are 
divided by all degrees and 
certificates awarded in the same 
year. “Completions” includes all 
degrees, certificates, diplomas or 
other formal awards granted by an 
institution in a year, regardless of 
when the student initially enrolled 
in that institution (i.e. as a 
freshman or a junior) and without 
regard to the number of years the 
student was enrolled before 
attaining the completion. (Much as 
the average cost per student does 
not distinguish between costs by 
level of student or discipline, 
spending per completions does not 
distinguish between spending on 
different types of degrees and 
certificates awarded). 




11922 22.289 12.324 
The total number of degrees 
granted per 100 full time 
equivalent students enrolled. 





11925 23.391 24.088 
The total number of completions 
(awards, certificates, and degrees) 
granted per 100 full time 
equivalent students enrolled. 
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Variable Observa-tions Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Description and Source 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Unionized 12038 0.327 0.469 
National Center for the Study of 
Collective Bargaining in Higher 




Control 12038 0.427 0.34 
Vanderbilt University, State 
Politics and Judiciary Code Book 
1987-2005, The Council of State 
Governments, Book of States 
2005-2009 
 
Selectivity 9945 0.667 0.177 
Total admission/Total 
Applications. 




11970 9834.712 12666.8  
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Knott and 
Payne 12038 2.672 1.139 
Categorical variable that measures 
the degree of centralization in state 
regulatory system for higher 
education. 
Sources: Knott and Payne  
State GDP 
Per Capita 12038 33372.37 8702.626 





11767 2.093  1.064 
The 2005 Carnegie Classification 
includes all colleges and 
universities in the United States 
that are degree-granting and 
accredited by an agency recognized 
by the U.S. Secretary of Education 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Right To 
Work 12038 0.468 0.499 







12038 78.18 17.347 
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